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Abstract
This paper gives a fresh look at my previous work on “epistemic actions” and in-
formation updates in distributed systems, from a coalgebraic perspective. I show
that the “relational” semantics of epistemic programs, given in [BMS2] in terms of
epistemic updates, can be understood in terms of functors on the category of coal-
gebras and natural transformations associated to them. Then, I introduce a new,
alternative, more reﬁned semantics for epistemic programs: programs as ”epistemic
coalgebras”. I argue for the advantages of this second semantics, from a semantic,
heuristic, syntactical and proof-theoretic point of view. Finally, as a step towards
a generalization, I show these concepts make sense for other functors, and that
apparently unrelated concepts, such as Bayesian belief updates and process trans-
formations, can be seen to arise in the same way as our “epistemic actions”.
1 Introduction
Epistemic models have been used as models for partial information in multi-
agent systems. But epistemic models are static: they are models that only
take into account the state of information (knowledge or belief) of every agent
involved at a given time. However, the most important issues have to do
with information ﬂow: the changes aﬀecting the agent’s information states,
changes due to various actions (message-passing or other forms of informa-
tion exchange, information updates or even disinformation). There are some
notions of knowledge programs and knowledge protocols in the literature, but
no general, robust one: most of these notions are local, as they live in a ﬁxed
epistemic-dynamic model: they do not describe generic kinds of changes, that
might aﬀect (in diﬀerent ways) any arbitrary epistemic situation. Hence, the
1 Email: baltag@comlab.ox.ac.uk
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problem of oﬀering a good dynamic counterpart of epistemic models can be
considered as still open.
History of the Problem. Information ﬂow was the central subject of
[FHMV], and this book gives the standard approach to this subject. How-
ever, the authors do not introduce or study epistemic programs in a formal
way, since they are committed to a temporal point of view: they use a combi-
nation of temporal and epistemic models, and use a temporal-epistemic logic
to study them. 2
The work of J. Gerbrandy is the ﬁrst one that really addressed this problem
in a general enough frame (although his work has been partially anticipated by
J. Plaza, J. van Benthem, F. Veltman and others). He used non-wellfounded
sets to provide a semantics for a restricted notion of epistemic programs;
essentially, this is a particular case of our “Third Deﬁnition of Epistemic
Updates” (in section 3 below), in terms of the ﬁnal coalgebra. He did not
study updates as formal semantic objects (relations on the ﬁnal coalgebra),
but simply described for each program modality, a speciﬁc such relation. His
syntax for programs was very limited, and as a result he could describe only
a very restricted class of programs.
In past work 3 , we have introduced a general notion of “epistemic actions”,
subsuming many various information updates encountered in the literature (in-
cluding Gerbrandy’s programs), and we have studied the logic induced by such
programs, in PDL style, providing a complete axiomatization. But we did not
concentrate on the semantic aspect: epistemic actions were introduced there
simply as syntactic notions, as a way to generate dynamic modalities. The
semantics for these modalities was given (similarly to Gerbrandy’s) by describ-
ing in detail a speciﬁc model-theoretic construction for each such modality;
but these model-theoretic transformations were not considered and studied as
objects in their own respect, and so there was no really semantical notion of
epistemic actions. In recent 4 and current work 5 , this gap is ﬁlled, by giving
general semantic notions of “epistemic programs”. In particular, in [BMS2]
(still to appear), we introduced the notion of epistemic update (as deﬁned be-
low, in section 3, in the “First Deﬁnition” of update) and used it as our basic
semantics for epistemic programs. Our work on completeness has unexpect-
edly lead us to endow our syntactic action expressions with a structure similar
to the one of epistemic models: in eﬀect, this is nothing but a syntactic coal-
gebra. But we have not considered it as an alternative semantics for epistemic
programs; nor have we set our study (of epistemic models and programs) in
coalgebraic terms.
The Contribution of This Paper. This is ﬁrst of all a coalgebraic recon-
2 The relation between their work and ours is similar to the one between the two main
approaches to program veriﬁcation: temporal logic versus Hoare-style (or PDL-style) logics.
3 [BMS], joint work with L. Moss and S. Solecki.
4 [B2], [B3]
5 [BMS2], joint work with L. Moss and S. Solecki
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struction of most of my previous work. It is easy to see that epistemic models
are nothing but coalgebras for a simple functor. The ﬁrst new contribution is
showing that the notion of “epistemic updates” introduced in [BMS2] has a
natural category-theoretical meaning: namely, as pairs of functors on the cat-
egory of coalgebras and natural transformations related to the functors. This
notion makes sense in general, for arbitrary functors, giving us an interest-
ing notion of coalgebraic transformation. I give examples for other functors,
showing e.g. that it covers process transformations.
Another new contribution is the introduction of a more reﬁned semantics
for epistemic programs: the coalgebraic semantics. Roughly speaking, epis-
temic programs are seen to be themselves coalgebras for a functor of the same
type as the one which generates epistemic models (as coalgebras). This idea
originates in the syntactic coalgebra mentioned above (as implicit in our previ-
ous work); but now it is made explicit and taken at face value, as an alternative
semantics. I show this captures more features of epistemic programs than the
ﬁrst semantics, allowing us to deﬁne new useful operations. It also gives us
new useful tools for deﬁning and proving things about epistemic programs, by
coinduction.
In on-going work, I try to generalize this second semantics to a large class
of functors, obtaining something like a notion of “dynamic coalgebra” 6 . But
for now, I only give other examples of functors for which this can be done; in
particular, the Larson-Skou functor gives us a probabilistic notion of epistemic
models and epistemic programs. Standard Bayesian belief update can now
be seen as such a program, being the probabilistic analogue of the public an-
nouncement update. Our general notion provides an interesting generalization
of Bayesian update, which could be called Bayesian epistemic programs.
Preliminaries: Epistemic Models and Epistemic Propositions, Coal-
gebraically. Given a set Φ, a predicate on Φ is a function P : Φ→ 2, where
2 = {0, 1} is the set of truth values. We denote by Pred(Φ) =: Φ → 2
the family of all predicates on Φ. For a predicate P ∈ Pred(Φ) and an ob-
ject p ∈ Φ, we write P (p), and we say that P holds at p, or p satisﬁes P ,
whenever P (p) = 1. We sometimes identify a predicate P with the class
PΦ = {p ∈ Φ : P (p) = 1}.
For any endofunctor T : Set→ Set and any set Φ, we deﬁne an endofunctor
TΦ on Set by putting:
TΦ =: Pred(Φ)× T,
where we have ambiguously denoted by Pred(Φ) the constant endofunctor
associated to the set Pred(Φ) (mapping every set to the set Pred(Φ) and
every function to identity on Pred(Φ)).
For most of this paper, we shall consider only a particular choice for T .
Let us Ag be a ﬁnite set of agents, denoted by a, b, . . .. We shall use capital
6 I owe thanks to one of the referees for suggesting this name.
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letters A,B, . . . ⊆ Ag to denote ﬁnite sets of agents. Let κ be an inaccessible
cardinal and let Pk : Set → Set be the κ-bounded powerset endofunctor on
the category of sets (for sets, this is deﬁned by Pk(S) =: {X ⊆ S : |X| < κ}).
From now on (unless speciﬁed otherwise), we ﬁx T =: PAgκ .
Epistemic Models as Coalgebras. Fix now a class Φ of objects, denoted
by p, q, . . . and called atomic sentences. For this particular set Φ, we shall
denote by F =: TΦ = Pred(Φ) × PAgκ the functor TΦ introduced before. An
epistemic model (over a set Φ of atomic sentences) 7 is just an F -coalgebra;
i.e. a structure S = (S, e), with e : S → F (S), for the above functor F = TΦ.
Whenever the coalgebraic map e is understood, we use the notations s0 =:
e(s)0 and sa =: e(s)1(a); here, we denoted by t0 ∈ Pred(Φ), and respectively
t1 ∈ Pκ(S)Ag, the ﬁrst, and respectively the second, component of any object
t ∈ F (S) = Pred(Φ) × PκSAg. In an epistemic model S, the members of its
support S are called possible worlds or states. Observe that s0 is a predicate
on Φ called the (factual) content of the state s, and sa ⊆ S is a set of states,
called the appearance of state s to agent a. Since the atomic sentences p ∈ Φ
are supposed to describe “facts of the world”, the factual content s0 of a given
state s will be interpreted as telling us which “facts” hold at each state: we
say that p holds at state s in model S, and write pS(s), whenever s0(p) holds.
The appearance sa ⊆ S of state s to agent a is intuitively the set of all the
states that are “indistinguishable” from s to agent a: if the actual state were
s then agent a would think any of the states s′ ∈ sa might be the actual one.
The worlds s′ ∈ wa are the epistemic alternatives of the world s (for agent a).
For every agent, one can deﬁne a binary relation →a⊆ S × S of (epistemic)
indistinguishability for agent a, by setting: s→a s′ iﬀ s′ ∈ sa.
A pointed model (or pointed F -coalgebra) is just a pair (S, s) consisting of
an epistemic model S together with a designated state s, called the “actual
state” (or the “real world”).
Our models being F -coalgebras, they can be endowed with coalgebraic
morphisms as usually to form a category, which will be denoted by Mod =:
Coalg(F). As expected, the corresponding (Aczel-Mendler) notion of bisim-
ulation is in this case nothing but a binary relation R ⊆ S × S′ between two
models, such that whenever we have sRs′ we also have: (1) s0 = s′0; (2) for
every agent a ∈ Ag and every t ∈ sa there exists some t′ ∈ s′a such that
s′Rt′; (3) for every agent a ∈ Ag and every t′ ∈ s′a there exists some t ∈ sa
such that s′Rt′. We call epistemic bisimilarity, and denote by ∼, the no-
tion of coalgebraic bisimilarity obtained in this way. Similarly, we denote by
pMod =: pCoalg(F) the category of pointed models, where the morphisms
are coalgebraic morphisms mapping the designated (actual) of the ﬁrst model
to the designated state of the second model. The resulting notion of bisim-
ulation is just a bisimulation relating the two designated states, and we also
7 Observe that the notion of epistemic model is mathematically the same as the one of
“transition system” with basic predicates in Φ and “action labels” in Ag; only the interpre-
tation is diﬀerent: labels in Ag are taken to represent agents, instead of actions.
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denote the resulting bisimilarity relation by ∼.
As it is well known, the functor F = Pred(Φ) × PAgκ is bounded and has
a ﬁnal coalgebra Ω = ΩF . The ﬁnal map induces a map ωF : pMod → ΩF ,
having the property that two pointed models are bisimilar iﬀ they have the
same image via ωF .
Epistemic Propositions. “Epistemic properties” are epistemically relevant
properties of states in epistemic models. Epistemic properties are given by
epistemic propositions. We deﬁne several diﬀerent, but equivalent, versions of
this notion.
First Deﬁnition of Propositions. An epistemic proposition is a “bisimulation-
invariant predicate map” on epistemic models, i.e. a map P : Mod → Set,
associating to each model S some predicate PS ∈ Pred(S) on S, such that: if
PS(s) holds and (S, s) ∼ (T, t), then PT(t) holds.
But now one can easily see that bisimulation-invariance is a naturality
condition, which leads to our next version of the same concept:
Second (Category-Theoretical) Deﬁnition of Epistemic Propositions
(A. Kurz): Let U :Mod→ Set be the forgetful functor, taking each coalgebra
(S, e) to its support S. An epistemic proposition 8 is a natural transformation
P : U → 2.
By going to the ﬁnal coalgebra, we can factor over bisimilarity and simplify
this to the following:
Third Deﬁnition of Epistemic Propositions. An epistemic proposition
is a predicate PΩ : Ω→ 2 on the ﬁnal coalgebra Ω = ΩF , i.e. a Function into
the set 2 = {0, 1}.
Indeed, we can just take, for every pointed model (S, s), PΩ(ω(S, s)) =:
PS(s), and check that this function is well-deﬁned and is total function on Ω.
It is in fact easy to see that the above three deﬁnitions of “epistemic proposi-
tions” are equivalent: there exist canonical bijective correspondences between
the objects falling under any two of the above deﬁnitions. Using systematic
ambiguity (as we have already done in stating the above deﬁnitions), we shall
denote by the same names P the (corresponding) objects falling under the
above deﬁnitions, and call them all epistemic propositions.
Operations with Epistemic Propositions. Let PropF =: Pred(ΩF ) be
the family of epistemic propositions (seen as predicates on the ﬁnal coalgebra).
This collection is closed under various natural operations with predicates:
• The propositions  (“true”) and ⊥ (“false”) are deﬁned in the standard
way: (s) holds for all states s ∈ Ω, while ⊥(s) holds for none.
• Epistemic propositions are closed under standard Boolean operations ¬, ∧,
∨ with propositions/predicates: this is obvious is we think of them as predi-
cates on the ﬁnal coalgebra. We can even extend this to inﬁnite conjunctions
8 This is Kurz’s notion of “modal proposition”, introduced in the general context of Kripke
models.
21
Baltag
∧
and disjunctions
∨
.
• For each atomic sentence p ∈ C we have an atomic proposition p. On both
arbitrary coalgebras and the ﬁnal one, we can deﬁne p(s) to hold (at a state
s) iﬀ s0(p) holds. (Recall that s0 = e(s)0 ∈ Pred(Φ).)
• Epistemic Modalities: Knowledge or Belief. For any epistemic proposition
P and agent a, we can deﬁne another proposition ✷aP , by setting, for
every state s ∈ Ω: (✷aP)(s) iﬀ P(t) holds for all t ∈ sa We read this
new proposition as saying that (at the current state s) “agent a knows, or
believes that P”.
• Iterated Epistemic Modalities: Common Knowledge. For any proposition P
and any subgroup A ⊂ Ag of agents, we deﬁne a new proposition✷∗AP by us-
ing inﬁnite conjunction: ✷∗AP =:
∧{✷a1 . . .✷anP : n ≥ 0, a1, . . . , an ∈ A}.
This is the modality corresponding (in the standard Kripke semantics) to
the reﬂexive-transitive closure of the union of all indistinguishability rela-
tions→a with a ∈ A. We read ✷∗AP as saying that proposition P is common
knowledge among the members of the group A.
2 Epistemic Programs
Until now, all our models described only “static” epistemic situations: the
state of a system and the information states of all the agents at a given time.
We take now into account possible informational changes of the given system:
epistemic programs.
An epistemic program is a program taking pointed epistemic models as
both inputs and outputs. It represents an “epistemic computation” performed
on the information states of the agents, computation corresponding to some
speciﬁc way to induce an information update of all the agents: some form of
communication, announcement, discovery, act of introspection etc.
Examples of Epistemic Programs
1. Public Announcements P! Given an epistemic proposition P, we
can consider the action P! of publicly announcing that P is true (at the cur-
rent state). By this, we mean a truthful, fully reliable, public broadcasting
of the message P. This is an impersonal announcement: we are not inter-
ested for that moment in who does the announcing, but only consider it as an
anonymous announcement. 9
The eﬀect of this announcement is that all the agents publicly learn that
P was true (at the moment of its announcing). This means they all publicly
update their states of information, eliminating from their sets of possible states
the ones in which P was not true before this action happened. The fact that
this update is public means that, while doing it, each agent knows the others
do it as well, and he also knows the others know this etc.: in short, while this
9 One can of course model more “personal” announcements in our frame, but we just want
to keep it simple for now.
22
Baltag
action is happening, it is common knowledge that it is happening. This is why
it is called a public announcement.
However (as observed by J. Gerbrandy and others), it is not always the
case that the act of publicly announcing P is necessarily producing common
knowledge of P. This is because the truth-value of P might change due to its
own announcement: consider the proposition “The war has just started, but
John doesn’t know it.” By publicly announcing this (to everyone, including
John), the proposition which was announced has become false: now, John
knows.
2. Private Announcements P!A to subgroups. This is similar to the
previously mentioned action, except that the announcement is broadcasted
only to a subgroup A ⊆ Ag of “inside” agents, while it is assumed that none
of the “outsiders” suspect that this is happening: they don’t observe anything,
so they just assume by default that nothing is happening (or, if you like, that
the trivial action “skip” is happening...).
3.Private Announcements with Suspicious Outsiders. This is sim-
ilar to the previous action, except that while the private announcement is
broadcasted to the insiders, some outsider b ∈ A starts to suspect that this is
happening.
4. Private Announcements with Secret Interception by an Out-
sider (Wiretapping). As before, but now the outsider b actually ﬁnds out
what’s going on: he knows about the announcement, say because he “secretly
wiretaps” the insider’s conversation (or intercepts the message in some other
way). But the wiretapping is done in a completely secretive manner, so that
the none of the insiders suspects it is happening.
5. Tests P? For technical reasons (having to deal with conditional, if-
then-else, actions), we also need the standard (non-epistemic) notion of “test”.
The truth of a proposition P is “tested”, without necessarily anybody knowing
about it: this is an ’objective’ test. Such an action can only happen if P does
actually hold at the current state, and in this case the same state (in the
same model) is returned as the output; otherwise, this program “diverges”: it
fails to produce any output-state. A particular case is the action skip =: ?
(where  is the “true” proposition), which leaves everything unchanged.
6. Questions P?? This is the impersonal, public action of raising a ques-
tion “Does P hold?” is raised. No new information about the world is added
to the system: the output-state will be the same as the input-state. So, from
the input-output perspective, this is exactly like the skip action. However, as
we’ll see, these actions are diﬀerent from the point of their internal epistemic
structure; in a questioning action, the agents have some information about the
action itself (though not about the world): they learn that an issue has been
raised.
Operations with Epistemic Programs. We shall consider various natural
operations with epistemic programs:
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• The standard regular program constructors: given two programs π, ρ, it is
natural to consider their sequential composition π · ρ (“do ﬁrst π then ρ”),
their non-deterministic sum π + ρ (’choice’: “do either π or ρ”) and the
iteration (Kleene star) π∗ of a program π (“do π some ﬁnite number of
times”, deﬁnable for instance as the inﬁnite non-deterministic sum of all
the possible sequential compositions of ﬁnitely many copies of π).
• It is also natural to consider recursion (ﬁxed points): given equations (or
systems of equations) involving epistemic programs, of the form X = π(X),
we may consider the solution < X|X = π(X) > of this equation. We will of
course need to restrict the shape of the equations, imposing an appropriate
guardedness condition.
• Private Updating. For any agent a and program π, we consider the program
πa of “agent a privately updating her information state with π”. This is an
action in which agent a “learns” program π (without this program π nec-
essarily happening): agent a comes to believe (or “suspect”) that program
π might be currently running. Hence, so far as a is concerned, everything
goes on in this action as if π is actually running: a’s state of information
is changed according to π. But this is a ’fully’ private action of “gratu-
itous suspicion”: so far as all the other agents are concerned, nothing really
happens (or, if you like, they believe that the program skip is happening).
• Answering a Question. We may consider an operation that takes any public
question π = P?? and returns the action of (truthful, impersonal) public an-
swering Ans!(π) =: P!+¬P!. This is the public announcement of the correct
answer: indeed, the ﬁrst action (P!) can only happen when P (its precondi-
tion) is actually true, and then it consists of publicly announcing the truth
of P; similarly for the action ¬P!. As a result, the non-deterministic sum
P! + ¬P! is in fact a deterministic action, which announces P if it is true,
and else announces ¬P. One can generalize this to a operation of private
answering inside a subgroup A: put Ans!A(π) =: P!A + ¬P!A.
• “Interception of the secret message”: Private Discovery of the “Real” Ac-
tion. While a (possibly non-deterministic) π is taking place, a group A
uncovers what is really going on, including what is the actual deterministic
resolution of π. The outsiders do not know about this, so they see everything
exactly as if π was going on “undisturbed”. This program, called Ans!A(π),
generalizes the private answering of a question: while the non-deterministic
program π is going on, the insiders are announced the answer to the ques-
tion “what is really going on?”. For them, there is no non-determinism
or uncertainty left: they know precisely what’s happening, and how it’ll
turn out. If we apply this to the questioning program π = P??, we obtain
the previous example. But this operation generalizes many others: pri-
vate (and public) announcements P!A are also particular cases of this: we
have P!A = Ans!A(P?). Also, “private announcement with secret inter-
ception (wiretapping) by outsiders” is another special case, obtainable as
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Ans!B(P!A), where B is the group of outsiders doing the wiretapping (and
A, as before, is the group to whom the private announcement is addressed).
Basic Syntax for Epistemic Programs: We choose a few operations as
our basic program constructors. We start with a countable list of program
variables X,Y, . . . and, for any ﬁnite list X of variables, we construct program
expressions π, σ in the free variables X.
π ::= X | P? | π + σ | π · σ | π∗ | πa | < X|X = π >
where X is any variable, a ∈ Ag is any agent, and in the expression
< X|X = π >, the variable X is epistemically guarded, i.e. occurs only inside
subexpressions of the form σa (for some agents a). A variable X is closed in an
expression π if it occurs only inside subexpressions of the form < X|X = σ >
(for some other expressions σ). A program expression π is closed if all variables
are closed in it. Closed program expressions are sometimes also called simply
programs. Given an ﬁnite list π1, . . . , πn of programs, we use the abbreviations∑n
i=1 πi =: π1 + · · · πn and
∏n
i=1 πi =: π1 · · · ·πn. We also deﬁne the programs
skip =: ? and crash =: ⊥? (where  is the true proposition and ⊥ is the
false one), and deﬁne a questioning program P?? =: P? + ¬P? . In other
words, the (impersonal, public) action of raising a question is taken to be the
non-deterministic choice between testing P and testing ¬P.
3 Relational Semantics: Epistemic Updates
The update semantics captures only the “external”, input-output behaviour of
epistemic programs: it tells us, for given program and a given input-state in
an epistemic model, how will the program “update” the model, and what are
its possible output-states (living in the updated model); it gives, for each pro-
gram, a corresponding transition relation between any input epistemic model
and some output model. In conclusion, it associates to each epistemic program
π an epistemic update π
, which contains all the above information. I will give
here three equivalent versions of this notion, playing roles which are roughly
analogous to the three deﬁnitions of the notion of epistemic proposition.
Preliminary Notions. Given a relation R ⊆ S × T , its range function
Rˆ : S → P(T ) is deﬁned by: Rˆ(s) =: {t ∈ T : (s, t) ∈ R}. Also, the
powerset-lifting of the relation R is a relation RP ⊆ P(S)× P(T ), deﬁned by
putting (S ′, T ′) ∈ RP iﬀ: ∀s ∈ S ′∃t ∈ T ′ s. t. (s, t) ∈ R and ∀t ∈ T ′∃s ∈
S s. t. (s, t) ∈ R.
An update operator (or simply, an update) is a pair of operations r = (S →
Sr,S → rS), the ﬁrst being an update map taking any epistemic model S to
an updated model Sr, and the second giving an update relation rS ⊆ S × Sr
between the two models. The update relation can be understood as a “tran-
sition relation”, describing which states go to which states via a given pro-
gram: but it is a transition relation between models. Using powerset-lifting,
25
Baltag
we can see that an update operator can be alternatively described as a pair
r = (S → Sr,S → rˆS), where Sr is as above and rˆS : S → P(Sr) is a
non-deterministic “transition map” This is essentially the deﬁnition of “epis-
temic updates” in [BMS]. However, in order for an update to be epistemically
meaningful, it needs to satisfy some extra condition, requiring that the given
program behaves well with respect to (epistemic) bisimulation: An update
operator r = (S → S(r),S → rS) is said to preserve epistemic bisimilar-
ity if it has the property that: if (S, s) ∼ (T, t) then, for every s′ ∈ Sr
such that (s, s′) ∈ rS, there exists some t′ ∈ Tr such that (t, t′) ∈ rT and
(Sr, s′) ∼ (Tr, t′).
Proposition 3.1 Given an update operator r, the following are equivalent:
• r preserves epistemic bisimilarity
• for all models S,T and states s ∈ S, t ∈ T , we have that 10 : s ∼ t implies
rˆS(s) ∼P rˆT(t).
This leads to our
First Deﬁnition of Epistemic Updates: An epistemic update is deﬁned
as an update operator which preserves epistemic bisimilarity.
It is easy to see that bisimulation-preservation is equivalent to requiring
functoriality, and respectively naturality, of the ﬁrst, respectively second, com-
ponents of an epistemic update. This leads to the
Second Deﬁnition 11 of Epistemic Updates: Let U :Mod→ Set be the
forgetful functor from the category of models (=F -coalgebras) to the category
of sets. An epistemic update is a pair r = (↑r, rˆ), consisting of an endofunctor
↑r: Mod → Mod, on the category of F -coalgebras, together with a natural
transformation rˆ : U → P ◦ U◦ ↑r. (Here, P is the powerset endofunctor on
Set and ◦ is the composition of two functors.)
Finally, we can provide an analogue for updates of the third deﬁnition of
epistemic propositions. By going to the ﬁnal coalgebra Ω = ΩF , we can again
factor over bisimilarity:
Third Deﬁnition of Epistemic Updates. An epistemic update is just a
function rˆΩ : Ω → P(Ω), mapping every state in the ﬁnal coalgebra to a set
of such states. In other words, it is a P-Coalgebra for the powerset functor,
having as support the ﬁnal F -coalgebra Ω = ΩF . Obviously, we can associate
to any such function rˆΩ a binary relation rΩ ⊂ Ω × Ω on the ﬁnal coalgebra,
deﬁned by rΩ = {(x, y) ∈ Ω × Ω : y ∈ rˆΩ(x)}. We interpret this relation
as a transition relation between the states of the ﬁnal coalgebra. Obviously,
there is a bijective correspondence between functions from Ω to P(Ω) and
transition relations on Ω, so we can identify epistemic updates rˆΩ with such
10Here, ∼⊆ S×T is the relation of bisimilarity, i.e. the largest bisimulation, between the
two models.
11 This can be viewed as a generalization of the semantics of modal operators in terms of
natural transformations given in [K2].
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binary Relations rΩ on Ω.
Again, it is easy to see that the above three deﬁnitions of “epistemic up-
dates” are equivalent: there exist canonical bijective correspondences between
the objects falling under any two of the above deﬁnitions. As before, by sys-
tematic ambiguity, we use the same name (“updates”) and same notation for
all three notions. The point of having all three is that each can make sense in
diﬀerent contexts. When we want to see how a given epistemic program π does
actually aﬀect (“update”) a speciﬁc situation, it is more convenient to use the
ﬁrst deﬁnition; when proving category-theoretical properties, the second def-
inition is more useful. Finally, the third deﬁnition oﬀers the simplest way to
deﬁne (by corecursion) a relational semantics for various epistemic programs.
Example. The update semantics of a public announcement: Given
an epistemic proposition P, the epistemic update (in the sense of our ﬁrst
deﬁnition) P!
 = (S → SP!,S → rP!S ) associated to a public announcement
P! is deﬁned by: SP! =: SP, where SP is the relativization of the model S
to proposition P, i.e. the restriction of the model S to the set PS;
12 and
rPS =: {(s, t) ∈ S×SP : s = t} = {(s, s) : s ∈ S(P!)}, seen as a binary relation
between S and SP.
The semantics can be made even simpler by using the third deﬁnition: in
this version, the epistemic update induced by the public announcement P! is
given by a partial function f : Ω→ Ω, having as domain the class PΩ =: {s ∈
Ω : PΩ(s) = 1} = {ω(S, s) : s ∈ PS} , where recall that ω =: ωF is the map
from pMod to ΩF induced by the ﬁnal map; and whose values are deﬁned by
the corecursive deﬁnition: f(s)0 =: s0, f(s)a =: {f(t) : t ∈ sa ∩ dom(f)}, for
all states x ∈ dom(f) = PΩ. Since the program P! of public announcement
is deterministic, the update P!
Ω induced by this program could in fact be
identiﬁed with the partial function f deﬁned above. But, formally, they are
distinct, and the update P!
Ω : Ω→ PΩ is deﬁned putting P!
Ω(s) =: {f(s)} if
PS(s) holds, and P!


Ω(s) =: ∅ otherwise.
Update Equivalence. Two epistemic updates r = (S → Sr,S → rS and
r′ = (S → Sr′ ,S → r′S are equivalent if, for every pointed model (S, s), we
have: Sr ∼ Sr′ and rˆS(s) ∼P rˆ′S(s). We write r ≡ r′ for equivalent updates.
We say that two programs π, σ are update equivalent, and write π ≡ σ, if their
updates are equivalent: π
 ≡ σ
. Update equivalent programs are equivalent
from a purely “external”, input-output point of view.
If we use the third semantics and think of updates as Functions on ΩF ,
then update equivalence is just identity: r ≡ r′ iﬀ rΩ = r′Ω. So: if our notion
of equivalence for programs is update equivalence, then our third version of
update semantics is fully abstract.
Formal Semantics. For each closed program expression π we deﬁne an
12More explicitly, the relativization SP = (SP, {·Pa }a∈Ag, ·P0 ) of a model S = (S, {·a}a∈Ag, ·0)
to a proposition P is given by SP =: PS, sPa =: sa ∩ SP and sP0 =: s0, for all s ∈ SP. This
is a standard model-theoretic notion.
27
Baltag
update π
 : Ω→ P(Ω), and for each program expression π(X1, . . . , Xn) in free
variables X1, . . . , Xn, we deﬁne a function π

 of n variables, taking n-tuples of
updates into an update. The deﬁnition is recursive (and compositional). We
skip here the details concerning the semantics of free expressions, but only
mention the clauses for closed expressions: (P?)
(s) =: {s}, if P(s) holds, and
(P?)
(s) =: ∅ otherwise; (π + σ)
(s) =: π
(s) ∪ σ
(s), (π · σ)
 =: σ
(π
(s)),
(π∗)
(s) =:
⋃{(π
)n(s) : n ≥ 0}; (πa)
(s) =: {t}, where t is given by: t0 = s0,
ta =
⋃{π
(s′) : s′ ∈ sa} and tb = sb for all b = a. Finally, if π is a expression
in the free variable X only and if π
 is the corresponding unary function from
updates to updates, then < X|X = π >
 is the unique ﬁxed point 13 of the
function π
.
Dynamic Modalities: from Programs to Propositions. Every epistemic
update gives rise to a modality: a unary proposition operator. Given an
update r = (S → S(r),S → rS) and a proposition P, we can construct a
new proposition [r]P, saying that “after the update r, P will surely hold” (at
any possible output-state). This can be deﬁned by saying that ( [r]P )S(s)
holds iﬀ: PSr(t) holds for every t such that (s, t) ∈ rS. For programs π we
can thus deﬁne dynamic modalities, by setting [π]P =: [π
]P , meaning that
“after every execution of π (at the current state), P will hold”. If we use the
third semantics (thinking of propositions as predicates Ω → 2 on the ﬁnal
Coalgebra, and of updates as P-coalgebras on Ω) then this can be simpliﬁed
to: [π](P )(s) holds iﬀ P (t) holds for every t ∈ π
(s).
Proofs by Coinduction. We can prove many update identities, by a mix-
ture of coinduction on Ω and functional reasoning (pointwise identity). For
example, using the above coinductive deﬁnition of P!
, we can check that:
P! ≡ P? ·
∏
a∈Ag
P!a
This implies that we have the equivalence: P! ≡< X|X = P? ·∏a∈AgXa >,
which is why we chose to not have public announcements P! in our basic
syntax: they are already deﬁnable in our syntax, up to update equivalence.
Another update identity is: P?? ≡ skip, which shows that (impersonal,
public) questions induce no informational changes on a given epistemic model.
Disadvantages of the Update Semantics. Identifying the meaning of an
epistemic program with the epistemic update induced by it may be a conve-
nient and economical choice in many cases, but in general it runs in a number
of problems. As already mentioned, they only describe the informational fea-
tures of an epistemic program from a purely ’external’, input-output point of
view. They do not explicitly tell us anything about the inherent informa-
tional features of the program itself: what do agents know/see/suspect about
the program itself.
13 i.e. the unique solution of the update equation x ≡ π(x). The “epistemic guardedness”
condition guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the solution.
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One consequence of this is that the update semantics is not an adequate
semantics for questions: the last update identity mentioned above shows that
update semantics will necessarily identify every question with skip. Although
on one hand, we do feel indeed that questions do not necessarily add informa-
tion about the state of the world, they carry information about themselves:
they publicly raise an issue. This is absent in the update semantics, and as
a result the operation of answering a question (as deﬁned above) does not
make any sense in update semantics: there simply is no operation on updates
which will map P? + ¬P? into P! + ¬P!. This is because the ﬁrst program
is always update equivalent to skip: the information about P (about which
question was asked, which issue was raised) has disappeared. More generally,
there is no way to deﬁne the operation Ans!A of interception of the message,
or of “discovery” of the “real” action taking place. This operation is again
inconsistent with update equivalence 14 .
Another problem is that, for complicated actions, it is extremely hard to
get from the informal description of an epistemic action to its formal update
semantics. In general, we need for each such (informal description of) com-
plicated epistemic action, to give an algorithm to compute, for any arbitrary
epistemic model, the way this action will change the model. This is a compli-
cated business. And it is in any case very hard to visualize epistemic programs
in terms of their updates: these updates are huge objects, inﬁnite Functions
acting on Coalg(F).
Finally, update semantics doesn’t give us a clue towards ﬁnding the right
syntax for epistemic programs. The most important ingredients in that syn-
tax are the epistemic ones, which do not arise very naturally as operations
with updates: the operation of private updating πa with a program and the
operation of solving “epistemically guarded” systems of program equations.
The intuitions underlying for these operations lead us to an alternative, more
reﬁned semantics for epistemic programs: the coalgebraic semantics.
4 Coalgebraic Semantics: Epistemic Programs as Coal-
gebras
To explicitly formalize the inherent informational/epistemic aspects of a pro-
gram, we will now consider epistemic models for programs: the underlying
coalgebraic structure of the program itself. For this, we need to consider, in
addition to the functor F = TΦ, a diﬀerent functor G = TΨ, obtained by
changing our initial choice (ﬁxed until now) of the set Φ. Namely, instead
of the set Φ of atomic sentences, we take as our set Ψ =: Ω = ΩF the ﬁnal
coalgebra of the functor F . Then Pred(Ψ) = Pred(ΩF ) = Prop is nothing
but the set of all epistemic propositions. Taking now G = TΨ, we consider as
before G-coalgebras, as a new kind of epistemic models. But these are to be
14 or more precisely, update equivalence is not a congruence with respect to this operation
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thought as dynamic models: they are models for actions and programs.
An epistemic action structure is a G-coalgebra Σ = (Σ, -), with - : Σ →
G(Σ), for the above functor G = TΨ. As before, whenever - is understood,
we use the notations σ0 =: -(σ)0 and σa =: -(σ)1(a), for all agents a. In an
action structure, the members of Σ are called simple actions, σ0 is called the
precondition of action σ, and the set σa is called the appearance of σ to agent
a. Note that the precondition σ0 is a proposition. Intuitively, this proposition
gives the condition of possibility for action σ: this action can be executed at
a state s in an epistemic model S iﬀ the state satisﬁes the precondition of
the action; i.e. iﬀ (S, s) |= σ0, or equivalently if (σ0)S(s) holds. As for the
appearance sets, they express the agents’ state of knowledge (or belief) about
the action itself. The actions σ′ ∈ σa are the epistemic alternatives of the
action σ to agent a. As before we can write σ →a σ′, instead of σ′ ∈ σa, and
call this the (epistemic) indistinguishability relation for agent a: if the current
action happening is σ, then the agent a would think that any of the actions
σ′ ∈ σa might be happening.
This is just a variation of our initial setting obtained by changing TΦ with
G = TΨ, so all the notions carry over: we have essentially the same notion of
epistemic bisimilarity (but now between actions) and a ﬁnal coalgebra ΩG for
the category of action structures.
Deﬁnition (I) Semantically, an epistemic program (or a program model) is a
pair π = (Σ,Γ), consisting of an action structure (G-coalgebra Σ) and a subset
Γ ⊆ Σ of designated actions, called the currently possible actions.
Observe that program models are a kind of dynamic analogue of pointed
(state) models, but having a set of designated ’points’ instead of only one.
The reason has to do with non-determinism; indeed, deterministic actions will
correspond precisely to pointed action structures, i.e. program models having
a singleton as designated state. So deterministic actions are in bijection with
the members of Σ. But non-deterministic programs will have a maybe bigger
set of designated actions: these correspond to all deterministic resolutions
of program π. When executing π, any of the designated actions might be
happening: they are all the currently possible actions 15 .
We can once again factor over bisimilarity by going to the ﬁnal coalgebra.
Indeed, taking the ﬁnal map ωG : pCoalg(G)→ ΩG, we can associate to each
epistemic program π = (Σ,Γ) a unique subset |π| ⊂ ΩΓ, given by: |π| =:
{ωG(Σ, σ) : σ ∈ Γ}. This establishes a bijection between program models and
members of P(ΩG), so that we can identify the two classes of objects. This
gives a simpler version of the same notion:
Deﬁnition (II) An epistemic program is just a subset of the ﬁnal coalgebra
ΩG.
We use letters α, β to denote the elements of ΩG: they are the “univer-
15 although not all epistemically possible actions: some agents could think that other actions
in Σ may be happening).
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sal simple actions”. In this version, deterministic programs correspond to
singletons |π| = {α} ⊆ ΩG. We use systematic ambiguity to identify such
deterministic programs with their unique currently possible action, writing in
this case π = α and |π| = {π}.
Program Bisimilarity. Two programs π = (Σ,Γ), π′ = (Σ′,Γ′) are program
equivalent, or bisimilar, if there exists a bisimulation R ⊆ Σ × σ′ between
the two action structures s.t. (Γ,Γ′) ∈ RP (where RP is the powerset lifting
of R). Equivalently, if ∼⊆ Σ × Σ′ is the relation of bisimilarity (the largest
bisimulation) between the two structures, then the programs are bisimilar iﬀ
Γ ∼P Γ′. We write in this case π ∼ π′.
One can easily check that, if we look at programs as members of P(ΩG),
then program bisimilarity is just identity: π ∼ π′ iﬀ |π| = |π′|. This means
that our second version of coalgebraic semantics for programs, in terms of
P(ΩG), is fully abstract for program bisimilarity.
Program Bisimilarity is Stronger than Update Equivalence: It is
easy to see that: π ∼ π′ ⇒ π ≡ π′, but the converse is false. The questioning
program P?? = P? + ¬P? provides a counterexample: we saw it is update
equivalent to skip, but we’ll soon see the two are not bisimilar.
Examples and Pictures: from Informal Description to Coalgebraic
Semantics
Unlike the update semantics, the coalgebraic semantics is really very close
to the informal description of the epistemic program. Going from one to the
other is rather straightforward. To represent it graphically, we draw simple
actions as circles labelled with their own preconditions, and epistemic uncer-
tainty relations as arrows; we use double circles for the designated (“currently
possible”) action(s).
1. Public Announcements. First, the program P! is deterministic, so only
one action is currently possible: the set |P!| is a singleton. As announced, we
write |P!| = {P!}. As for the action P! itself, the informal description of the
program P! gives the main semantical features straight away: this is a truthful,
public announcement that P. Truthfulness means this action can only happen
if P holds: so P is the precondition of this action. As for the appearance,
publicity means that this actions “looks like itself” to all the agents: its only
epistemic alternative is itself. This gives us:
|P!| =: {P!}
P!0 =: P
P!a =: {P!}
So the picture P! is:
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	
P
a,b,...

Observe that the action skip can be considered as a particular case of this
(as well as of test P?), since we have: skip = ? ∼ !. Of course, skip
can be deﬁned directly by corecursion, setting: |skip| =: {skip}, skip 0 = ,
skipa = {skip}.
2. Private Announcements to Subgroups. The only diﬀerence from the
previous one is that now the appearance of the action to the ’outsiders’ is
skip: for them, nothing happens:
|P!A| =: {P!A}
(P!A)0 =: P
(P!A)a =: {P!A} for a ∈ A
(P!A)b =: {skip} for b ∈ A
which gives the picture
	
P
a∈A
 b ∈A

a,b,...

3. Tests. Observe that “objective” (non-epistemic, “invisible”) tests P? are
a particular case of the previous example: namely, when the set A of ’insiders’
is empty. Everybody is an outsider:
	
P a,b,... 
a,b,...

4. Private Announcements with Suspicious Outsiders. The same as
the previous one, except that the outsiders b consider both skip and the secret
announcement as possible, so the appearance to the outsiders consists of two
actions: the secret announcement and the skip action.
	
P
a,b,...


b ∈A

a,b,...

5. Private Announcements with (Secret) Interception by Outsider.
In this case, the outsider is in control, he “sees” the action as it is: so this
action appears as itself; while this time looks to the ’insiders’ as... fully private
announcement to their subgroup: so it looks like the action in Example 2
above.
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	
P
b ∈A
 a∈A
P
a∈A
 b ∈A

a,b,...

6. Non-deterministic programs The non-deterministic program in which
the ’insiders’ are privately announced either that P or that Q: maybe a coin is
thrown, and depending on its outcome, one or the other is announced. These
are the “rules of the game” and they are public: the outsiders (like everybody
else) know that one of these two announcements is going on, but don’t know
which. But the ’insiders’ hear the message, so they know.
	
P
a,b,...


b ∈B
	
Q
a,b,...

Non-destructive Programs. Observe that all the above programs have the
property that all agents stay “alive” throughout the program: i.e. αa = ∅
for any α ∈ Σ, a ∈ AG. We call these kind of programs non-destructive.
They correspond to updates in which no live agents are killed: i.e. if sa = ∅
and (s, t) ∈ r then ta = ∅. We are primarily interested in non-destructive
programs; observe that all the programs which can be deﬁned in our formal
syntax are non-destructive.
Deﬁning Program Operations by Corecursion:
Deﬁning main operations by corecursion is also much simpler in coalge-
braic semantics than in update semantics. But we have to assume that our
original set Ψ of propositions is closed under Boolean operations and modali-
ties (including dynamic modalities). Non-deterministic sum is just union (of
subsets of ΩG):
Sum: |∑i∈I πi| =:
⋃
i∈I |π|.
Private Updating. Given a program π and an action a, we deﬁne the
program πa by
|πa| =: {πa}
(πa)0 =: 
(πa)a =: |π|
(πa)b =: {skip} for b = a
Sequential Composition. Similarly, we deﬁne the operation · : ΩG×ΩG →
ΩG of sequential composition of simple actions α and β (which is again a
simple, deterministic action!) and then the sequential composition π ·σ of two
programs.
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(α · β)0 =: α0 ∧ [α]β0
(α · β)a =: {α′ · β′ : α′ ∈ αa, β′ ∈ βa}
|π · σ| =: {α · β : α ∈ |π|, β ∈ |π|}
Iteration: We deﬁne π∗ =:
∑
n≥0 π
n.
Answering Questions, Intercepting Messages, “Discovering What’s
Going On”. Now we can ﬁnally deﬁne the operation Ans!Aπ, by which,
while π is happening, the agents in A ﬁnd out what is going on (i.e. what is
the real deterministic resolution of π). As we saw earlier, this generalizes the
operations of answering a question, secretly intercepting a private message,
discovering on which side has fallen etc. But we also saw that this operation
could not be deﬁned in update semantics, since didn’t make sense there: it re-
quires distinguishing between update equivalent, but non-bisimilar, programs.
We need to deﬁne it for both programs π and simple actions α.
|Ans!Aπ| =: {Ans!Aα : α ∈ |π|}
(Ans!Aα)0 =: α0
(Ans!Aα)a =: {Ans!Aα} for a ∈ A
(Ans!Aα)b =: αb for b ∈ A
Solving Fixed-Point (Systems of) Equations. In the coalgebraic seman-
tics, it is much easier (than in the update semantics) to solve (now, up to
program bisimilarity!) systems of “epistemically guarded” equations. In fact,
if for a second we look at the coalgebraic pictures of program as if they were
processes, we can easily see the notion of “epistemic guardedness” is just the
analogue of the standard notion of guardedness. So the existence of unique
solutions up to bisimulation for such guarded equations follows from the cor-
responding classical results for processes.
Formal Semantics. Using the above-deﬁned basic programs and operations
with programs, it it straightforward to recursively deﬁne the coalgebraic se-
mantics for our basic program syntax: closed program expressions are inter-
preted as programs, and expressions with n free variables as n-ary functions
from programs to programs. The semantics is compositional, and fully abstract
with respect to program bisimilarity.
Proofs by Coinduction. Proving by coinduction program identities (up to
bisimilarity) is even more straightforward than in the update semantics. The
following are easy exercises:
P! ∼ P? ·
∏
a∈Ag
P!a
Ans!A(P??) ∼ P!A + ¬P!A
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where P?? =: P?+¬P?; and ﬁnally, for all non-destructive programs, we have:
π ∼
∑
a∈|π|
α0? ·
∏
a∈Ag
(αa)
a
where αa =:
∑{β : β ∈ αa} is the “apparent action” (the way action α
appears 16 to a). This is another action, denoted by systematic ambiguity in
the same way as the set αa (the “appearance” of α to a). This last identity
allows us in fact to prove a Representation Theorem, saying that our basic syn-
tax is suﬃcient to present all non-destructive ﬁnitary programs (i.e. programs
whose underlying simple action structure is ﬁnite):
Proposition 4.1 Every non-destructive ﬁnitary program π = (Σ,Γ) (with Σ
of ﬁnite cardinality) is representable in our basic syntax up to bisimilarity,
without using the operator of (Kleene) iteration ∗. The converse is also true:
every program built in this way is ﬁnitary.
Recovering Epistemic Updates: The “Product Update”. Obviously,
any semantics for programs must at least tell us the input-output behaviour of
the program. In the coalgebraic semantics, this is done by associating to each
epistemic program π ⊆ ΩG an epistemic update π
 : ΩF → P(ΩF ). This can be
deﬁned directly, by corecursion, but to make this more transparent, it is better
to think of states as living in generic F -coalgebras S and of simple actions
as living in G-coalgebras Σ. We ﬁrst deﬁne a partial “update” operation
⊗ : Coalg(F) ×Coalg(G) → Coalg(F), called the update product S ⊗ Σ of
the two coalgebras:
S⊗ Σ =: {(s, σ) ∈ S × Σ : s∈(σ0)S}
(s, σ)0 =: s0
(s, σ)a =: {(s′, σ′) ∈ S ⊗ Σ : s′ ∈ sa, σ′ ∈ σ}
The intuition is that independent epistemic uncertainties must be ’multi-
plied’ : if when the current state is s agent thinks that state s′ might be the
current state, and when the current action is α agent a thinks that α′ might
be the current action, then when in the output state ·α agent a thinks that
s′ · α′ might be the output state.
The update product is a functor between the product categoryCoalg(F)×Coalg(G)
and Coalg(F): for coalgebraic morphisms f : S → S′, g : Σ → Σ′, the mor-
phism f ⊗ g : S⊗Σ→ S′ ⊗Σ′ is given by (f ⊗ g)(s, σ) =: (f(s), g(σ)). Thus,
each G-coalgebra Σ will induce a functor ↑Σ: Coalg(F)→ Coalg(F), given by
↑Σ (S) = S⊗Σ. If, in fact, we are given a program π = (Σ,Γ) then Γ induces a
16Observe that a deterministic action α might “appear” to a to be non-deterministic: this
is because, as far as appearances go, epistemic non-determinism is real determinism. If
agent a has more than one epistemic alternative for α then this actions appears to him as
non-deterministic.
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natural transformation Γˆ : U → P ◦U◦ ↑Σ: indeed, for each F -coalgebra S we
can deﬁne a ΓˆS : S → P(S⊗Σ) by putting: ΓˆS(s) =: {(s, σ) ∈ S⊗Σ : σ ∈ Γ}.
In this way, we recover the epistemic update π
 = (↑Σ, Γˆ) associated to our
program π = (Σ,Γ).
Towards a Generalization. Obviously, our ﬁrst semantics makes sense, not
just for functors of the form F = TΦ, but for arbitrary functors F having a
ﬁnal coalgebra. If for instance, we take F = 1 + Pκ(A × Id), where A is an
arbitrary set of “actions”, 1 is the constant functor associated to a singleton set
1 = {∗} and Id is the identity functor on Set, then F -coalgebras (S,E) can be
interpreted as process with actions in A and possibility of deadlock. Any s ∈ S
with e(s) = ∗ stands for “deadlock” δ. Then updates can be interpreted as
process transformations. An example of such transformation is encapsulation:
blocking all actions in a set H ⊆ A, i.e. renaming them to deadlock δ. Other
examples are sequential, or parallel, composition with a ﬁxed process. The
Larsen-Skou functor L is another example, which actually is closer to ours,
since it is of the form TΦ: for a set S put T (S) = {µ : µ : S → [0, 1]
is a ﬁnite measure with
∑
s∈S µ(s) = 1}, and for a map f : S → S ′, put
Tf : T (S) → T (S ′), (T (f)µ)(s′) =:∑a∈f−1(b) µ(a). This gives a functor, and
if in addition we ﬁx a set Φ of “basic predicates” and a set A of “actions”, we
can take the functor L = TΦ, according to our earlier deﬁnition. This gives a
notion of probabilistic process with actions in A and predicates in Φ, for which
we get a corresponding notion of process transformation.
However, in the last case, as many others, the second, coalgebraic semantics
can also be generalized. This is natural, if we interpret labels a ∈ A as agents
instead of actions, and interpret T -coalgebras (S, e) as probabilistic epistemic
models, instead of processes: we read e(s)(a)(s′) = p as saying that if the
current state is s, agent a believes that the probability of the current state to
be s′ is p. We use similar notations as above, putting s0 = e(s)0, sa = e(s)1(a)
Then, if we take again the set Ψ = Pred(ΩTΦ , we can naturally deﬁne a
“probabilistic product update”, ⊗ : Coalg(TΦ) × Coalg(TΨ) → Coalg(TΦ).
The support set S ⊗ Σ and (s, σ)0 are deﬁned as above, and we put
(s, σ)a(s
′, σ′) =:
sa(s
′) · σa(σ′)∑{sa(t) · σa(τ) : t ∈ S, τ ∈ Σ}
This is functorial (acting on morphisms as our product update functor does),
and implements the same idea of multiplying independent uncertainties, but
in a probabilistic setting, with renormalization. This combines the ideas of
product update with Bayesian revision. In particular, it is easy to see that
classical Bayesian revision corresponds in this setting to our program of “public
announcement”.
Conclusions. The coalgebraic semantics gives us a more reﬁned view of epis-
temic programs, exhibiting the internal informational features of an action.
It allows us to deﬁne useful operations (answering a question, interception)
with programs which weren’t deﬁnable in a purely input-output semantics.
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It makes easy to go from the informal description of an informational ex-
change to its semantics as an epistemic program. It facilitates the deﬁnition
of complicated operations by corecursion, and proving identities of programs
by coinduction. It has suggested a good syntax for such programs. Finally, it
suggests possible generalizations.
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